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Editors’Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL ON Economic Activity held its eighty-fourth con-
ference in Washington, D.C., on September 6 and 7, 2007. The conference
was a celebration in honor of William Brainard and George Perry, who
retired this year as editors of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Perry is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and had edited the
journal since its inception in 1970. Brainard is the Arthur Okun Professor
Emeritus of Economics at Yale University; he joined Perry as editor in 1980
after the death of Arthur Okun, the other founding editor.
George Perry and Bill Brainard made the Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity one of the premier economic journals in the country. For almost
four decades, the Brookings Papers has presented research on current,
large-scale issues in macroeconomics, broadly deﬁned. The analysis typi-
cally has been empirical, has taken real-world institutions seriously, and has
been relevant to economic policy. In many respects the Brookings Papers
has stood at the intersection of research and policymaking, encouraging
economists to apply the profession’s best knowledge to important policy
issues and to use policy concerns as a spur to research that illuminates
fundamental aspects of behavior. With insight and energy, Brainard and
Perry recruited authors, offered counsel on their research, chose incisive
discussants and Panel members, and edited and reedited papers for sub-
stance and clarity. Their skilled and dedicated stewardship enabled the
Brookings Papers to play a central role in the economics profession and to
have tremendous inﬂuence on the conduct of economic policy.
The celebratory conference in September was structured differently
from usual meetings of the Brookings Panel. At the conference dinner,
several long-standing participants reviewed the history of the journal and
offered personal appreciations for the contributions of George Perry and
Bill Brainard, and of Arthur Okun as well. This issue of the Brookings
Papers begins with two of these sets of remarks, given by Robert Gordon
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number of fields within macroeconomics to summarize the evolution and
state of knowledge in their areas or to highlight new perspectives and intel-
lectual challenges. The ten papers in this issue respond admirably to this
request, offering provocative views about business cycle dynamics, inﬂa-
tion and unemployment, monetary and fiscal policy, financial markets,
international capital flows, earnings inequality, time allocation, and the
effect of energy shocks. The papers had no formal discussants, but a syn-
opsis of the general discussion is included after each paper.
Robert Hall’s paper on what he calls the “modern recession” begins with
the observation that employment fell as far below trend during the past
two recessions as in earlier recessions, even though output did not—that
is, productivity did not decline in the two recent recessions the way it did in
earlier ones. Hall also shows that the softening of the labor market during
modern recessions is caused by declines in the job-finding rate for the
unemployed rather than increases in the rate of job loss, and that all sec-
tors of the labor market slacken simultaneously during modern recessions,
as in earlier ones.
To explain the volatility of unemployment, Hall argues that the
Mortensen-Pissarides model of job search and matching “holds out the tan-
talizing possibility of an equilibrium theory without excessively elastic
labor supply.” In particular, reducing the flexibility of the wage bargain
between firms and workers in this model would allow small productivity
ﬂuctuations to generate realistic movements in unemployment. The paper
reviews several ways of diminishing this ﬂexibility. However, Hall warns
that even this approach could not explain the past two recessions, in which
productivity did not fall.
George Akerlof and William Dickens reconsider the macroeconomics of
low inﬂation, a subject they explored in two earlier Brookings Papers with
George Perry. In “The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation,” the three
authors examined the consequences of downward nominal wage rigidity; in
“Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting,” they examined the consequences
of people thinking in nominal rather than real terms when inﬂation is very
low. In both papers a trade-off emerges between inflation and unemploy-
ment in the long run as well as in the short run. As a result, inﬂation that is
permanently very low generates a signiﬁcant cost in terms of permanently
higher unemployment. For example, in the benchmark simulation in the
ﬁrst paper, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry found that a permanent reduction in
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1.5 percentage points.
In their paper in this issue, Akerlof and Dickens explore some “unfin-
ished business” from those previous papers—namely, an intuitive expla-
nation for the magnitude of this trade-off. The authors show that the
magnitude depends crucially on the elasticity of the demand for labor.
Microeconometric studies of labor demand traditionally ﬁnd this elasticity
to be small, but it is the macroeconomic elasticity of labor demand that
affects the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Akerlof and
Dickens contend that both logic and an array of aggregate evidence imply
that the macro elasticity is much larger than the micro elasticity.
Benjamin Friedman notes in his paper that aggregate economic perfor-
mance has been quite good during the past quarter century and that econo-
mists’ understanding of both monetary and fiscal policy has advanced
greatly during this time. But interesting and important questions remain.
For fiscal policy, Friedman asks whether the systematic use of counter-
cyclical measures would be a positive addition to policymakers’toolkit. He
also highlights a set of issues regarding the long-run impact of govern-
ment debt.
For monetary policy, Friedman explains that the textbook story about
how the Federal Reserve affects interest rates “bears essentially no resem-
blance” to how monetary policy is actually conducted, and he argues that
developing a more realistic explanation is a challenge to economic think-
ing. He also describes important changes in the economy and the ﬁnancial
system that have altered the channels through which monetary policy
affects nonfinancial conditions, thereby casting doubt on the traditional
view of the monetary transmission mechanism. Lastly, Friedman expresses
skepticism that inﬂation targeting would contribute to the transparency of
policy or the accountability of policymakers, given the Federal Reserve’s
dual mandate to promote both price stability and maximum employment.
Christopher Sims’paper discusses the importance of using “probability
models” in making monetary policy. He begins by drawing a contrast
between these models, which are estimated consistently as systems of equa-
tions, and models traditionally used at central banks, which involve various
ad hoc restrictions and are estimated partly as single equations later com-
bined together. Sims argues that non-probability models may have a role
in organizing policy discussions but provide no objective ways to assess
their accuracy, to compare their performance with that of other models, or
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probability models. More generally, Sims contends that “the language of
probability is the only clear means of communication” when groups of
people inside and outside central banks need to talk about uncertainty and
relate large amounts of data to the current state of uncertainty.
Sims also writes that the Bayesian approach to inference pioneered by
Frank Smets and Raf Wouters is central to reintegrating probability-based
inference and policy modeling. The Bayesian approach deals in a straight-
forward way with two relevant conditions: when policymakers need to
combine information from data with their own judgment, and when the
number of unknown parameters is large and some are poorly pinned down
by the data. In addition, recent improvements in computational hardware
and solution algorithms have made applying this approach much easier.
Richard Cooper disputes “two related propositions that are widely
accepted as truths: that Americans save too little, and that the U.S. current
account deficit is unsustainably large.” In contrast with this conventional
wisdom, Cooper argues that U.S. national saving is quite adequate, espe-
cially if one accounts properly for investment in education and in research
and development. Cooper also asserts that the size of the current account
deﬁcit is understandable in light of three factors. The ﬁrst is increased inter-
national diversification by investors; indeed, the current account deficit
would be even larger if there were no “home bias” in international invest-
ments. Second is the slower growth of the population and the labor force
in other rich countries, which reduces desired investment there. Third is a
comparative advantage on the part of the United States in producing mar-
ketable securities that appeal to investors with diverse portfolio tastes, and
especially in exchanging low-risk, low-return debt for higher-risk, higher-
return equity.
Cooper contends further that the current account deficit is welfare
enhancing as long as the funds are invested productively in the U.S. econ-
omy, and that the deficit may remain large for years to come. Cooper
acknowledges that the current deficit cannot rise indefinitely relative to
GDP, that foreign-owned assets cannot rise indeﬁnitely as a share of total
assets, and that psychological factors could induce a significant deprecia-
tion of the dollar at any time. However, the turning point in so-called global
imbalances may not be reached for a decade or longer.
Robert Shiller investigates the relationship between the low long-term
interest rates and high asset prices that have prevailed in the past few years.
xii Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
10922-00b_Editors Sum.qxd  1/25/08  11:04 AM  Page xiiMany observers believe—and basic finance theory suggests—that these
phenomena are connected: After all, low interest rates mean that future
asset returns are discounted at a low rate, which pushes up the present value
of the assets. However, Shiller contends that asset prices today are high
not for this reason but principally because of changes in the model of the
economy believed by the public.
The paper shows that although interest rates are indeed lower and asset
prices higher than in the 1980s, the big movements in stock prices and real
estate prices during the past decade do not line up with movements in long-
term interest rates over the same period. This result for stock prices is con-
sistent with much earlier ﬁndings by John Campbell and Shiller that stock
prices are not well explained using present-value models with time-varying
interest rates. The present paper also argues that the real interest rate, a cen-
tral element of economists’analysis of asset prices, is not used or under-
stood by most people. Instead people appear to connect asset-price booms
with increased availability of credit: The phrase “awash with liquidity”
appears in newspapers with much greater frequency during the mid-1980s
preceding the 1987 stock market crash, during the stock market boom of the
late 1990s, and during the housing boom starting in 2004. Shiller concludes
that changes in popular economic models are more central to asset-price
movements than economists generally recognize.
Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz explore long-run changes in the U.S.
wage structure. Differences in wages across high and low earners declined
from 1910 to 1950, were roughly stable in the 1950s and 1960s, and
increased rapidly after 1980. The widening of wage inequality during the
past quarter century occurred in two stages: Initially, wages at the top of the
distribution rose fastest, wages in the middle rose less rapidly, and wages 
at the bottom rose least of all. Since the late 1980s, wages at the top have
continued to increase relative to wages in the middle, but wages in the 
middle have not risen further relative to wages at the bottom. This recent
polarization of wage changes is mirrored in employment, with shifts into
high-wage and low-wage jobs at the expense of middle-wage positions.
In explaining these patterns, Goldin and Katz place most of the weight
on changes in the return to education. They show that skill-biased tech-
nological change has generated rapid growth in the demand for more-
educated workers for at least the past century. During much of this time, rising
educational attainment generated even faster growth in the supply of skills,
which narrowed wage differentials. However, the advance of educational
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and only modest increases in the share of young adults completing four-
year college degrees. This slowdown caused a sharp decline in the relative
growth of skill supply, which led to wider wage differentials. Goldin and
Katz also assert that computers are substitutes for the skills characteristic of
many middle-wage jobs but are complements for the abstract tasks required
in many high-wage jobs and have little bearing on low-wage jobs; this
combination depresses employment and wages in the middle of the wage
distribution.
In a related vein, the paper by Robert Gordon and Ian Dew-Becker sur-
veys three aspects of rising inequality: developments within the bottom 
90 percent of the income distribution, developments within the top 10 per-
cent, and developments in the United States compared with other nations.
Regarding the change in relative income between individuals at the 10th
and those at the 90th percentile of the distribution, the authors conclude that
eroding union power, increasing imports, rising immigration, a declining
real minimum wage, and a reduction in top-bracket tax rates have all played
a role, with different factors mattering more or less at different points since
1975.
In examining rising inequality at the top of the income distribution, 
Gordon and Dew-Becker distinguish three types of individuals: Superstars
in sports and entertainment have benefited from advances in communica-
tions technology that have led to a magniﬁcation of audiences, which pro-
vides disproportionate rewards to the very best. Corporate executives
receive compensation set by boards of directors that are often chosen by the
executives themselves and include their peers; the authors contend that
managerial collusion lies behind the large gains in CEO pay. Lastly, a third
group of professionals—partners in major law firms, investment bankers,
hedge fund managers, and some others—receive earnings that, unlike those
of the ﬁrst two groups, are both market-driven and not ampliﬁed by access
to a mass audience. Cross-country differences in the rise in inequality may
be driven by differences in institutional factors, including governance struc-
tures and the use of stock options in compensation.
Alan Krueger asks whether Americans are spending their time more or
less enjoyably today than in earlier generations. His paper provides two
alternatives to the traditional approach in which researchers use their own
judgments to classify activities as work, home production, or leisure. The
ﬁrst alternative assigns activities to categories based on people’s reported
xiv Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
10922-00b_Editors Sum.qxd  1/25/08  11:04 AM  Page xivaffective experiences—feeling interested, stressed, happy, sad, pain, or
tired—during various activities. The second alternative calculates the so-
called U-index, which measures the percentage of time spent in activities
during which people’s strongest emotion is a negative one. Both analyses
use historical time-use data and recent responses to the Princeton Affect and
Time Survey.
Krueger finds that the share of time spent watching television has
increased substantially over the last four decades, while time devoted to
household chores such as ironing has decreased. Men have experienced a
gradual downward trend in the proportion of time spent in unpleasant activ-
ities, primarily due to a reduction in paid work. In contrast, women have
experienced no clear trend in the balance of pleasant and unpleasant activ-
ities, as a reduction in household chores has been accompanied by an
increase in market work. Time spent watching television, which people
appear to find more pleasant than work or chores but less pleasant than
socializing with friends, has increased considerably in the past forty years
for both men and women, even as time spent in the most enjoyable forms of
leisure activities has declined. Krueger concludes that understanding the
causes and implications of this increase is a key objective for future
research.
William Nordhaus’s paper investigates the explanations for what he
terms the “surprising oil noncrisis of the early to mid-2000s.” When the
United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, many economists feared that the
war would lead to a sharp decline in oil supply, a spike in oil prices, and
problems in the U.S. economy akin to those following the oil shocks of
1973, 1978, and 1990. Indeed, real oil prices more than tripled between
the fourth quarter of 2001 and the third quarter of 2006. However, the eco-
nomic problems associated with earlier oil-price increases did not appear.
Instead output continued to grow relative to potential output after the shock,
unemployment continued to fall, and there appears to have been no sub-
stantial pass-through of the energy-price increases into wages or other
nonenergy prices.
Nordhaus identiﬁes three possible reasons why the economy performed
so much better after the oil-price shock of the 2000s than after the earlier
shocks. First, the latest shock was less of a surprise and occurred more
gradually. Second, the transmission mechanism between the shock and the
rest of the economy was weaker, perhaps because the Federal Reserve
reacted better and because individuals and firms thought the oil-price
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forces—such as government purchases, exports, and ﬁnancial conditions—
were either neutral or working against the shock, rather than working with
it, as happened in earlier episodes. Nordhaus concludes that oil-price
shocks are likely to be less damaging to the economy than many analysts
came to believe in the wake of earlier shocks.
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